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INTRODUCTION
Unpredictable world situations where friends and
foes might be twisted have led states to formulate a
policy which aims to keep their national interests
secure in international affair. The Asia Pacific has
witnessed an array of cooperation and potential
conflict due to power shifting in the region. The two
dominant states in the region, the United States
(U.S.) and China, are seemingly eager to balance each
other given various forms of either bilateral or multi-
lateral forum. Vexing situation of dealing with the
longstanding conflict in regard to disputed territory
seems to be conceivable in one of the richest marine
biodiversity areas, notably known as the South China
Sea. Given its importance as the most used sea pas-
sages in the world, many states are aware of taking
advantage of it. However, the recent massive land-
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Abstrak
Laut Tiongkok Selatan telah menjadi saksi terjadinya proyeksi kekuatan global dikarenakan besarnya peluang sumber daya alam yang tersimpan di
dalamnya. Setidaknya terdapat enam negara yang menjadi negara penuntut (claimant states) dalam konflik Laut Tiongkok Selatan yaitu Republik
Rakyat Tiongkok, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, dan Filipina. Amerika Serikat sebagai aktor eksternal, tetap berupaya untuk meyakinkan bahwa
kehadirannya tetap dibutuhkan untuk menjaga stabilitas kawasan. Situasi ini menimbulkan dilema keamanan (security dilemma) yang berakibat pada
kompetisi kekuatan, sehingga menjaga perdamaian dan keamanan menjadi hal yang penting. Oleh karena itu, Indonesia sebagai salah satu negara
yang berpengaruh di kawasan dan bukan merupakan negara pentuntut (non-claimant states) berupaya untuk menekankan pentingnya kerjasama
regional untuk menjaga keamanan melalui visi maritim. Penelitian ini bermaksud untuk melihat sejauh mana kerjasama regional dapat menjadi sarana
untuk (1) menstabilkan keamanan regional dengan mempertimbangkan pola ketergantungan antara negara, (2) mendorong terwujudnya kebersatuan
di tingkat regional, dan (3) mengurangi kemungkinan proyeksi kekuatan global.
Keywords: Laut Tiongkok Selatan, security dilemma, Indonesia, visi maritime
Abstract
The South China Sea has witnessed an array of global power projections given the huge amount of potential resources there. There are at least six
countries who committed to be claimant states; China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Despite its role as the external actor, the
United States claimed that their presence is needed in order to preserve stability in the region. This vexing situation has led to security dilemma which
brings about power competition thereby maintaining peace and security would be critical. Therefore, Indonesia as one of region‘s rising powers who
commits to be a non-claimant state, iterated the importance of establishing cooperation to preserve regional security under maritime vision albeit its
national interests at stake there. This research examined the extent to which Indonesia maintains neutrality while pursuing national interests in the
South China Sea under the maritime vision. Cooperation could therefore become the tools for (1) stabilising regional security given the increase of
interdependence among states, (2) forging the immersion of regional unity, and (3) lessening the global power projections.
Keywords: The South China Sea, security dilemma, Indonesia, maritime vision, national interests
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reclamation activity by China on the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea has alarmed many countries
engaged in the Asia Pacific region. China insisted that
maritime reclamation has been part of its legal activity
on the sea. However, when other countries like Japan
have been fortifying the Okinotiri Islands and de-
manded an exclusive economic zone, the United
States has been silent on this matter (Huaxia, 2015).
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) is thus expected to become a legal
guideline for all claimants to comply with the peaceful
dispute settlement. It is stated that every state has the
right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to
a limit of 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this convention
(UNCLOS, 1982). However, China has made new
claim over the ‘’nine-dashed line” which embraces
some 80% of the South China Sea is described as
China’s historic waters. This claim has raised the
awareness of its neighbors such as the Philippines and
Vietnam as they believe that they too are entitled to
benefit from the natural resources and other potentials
of the region. Sovereignty claims and energy vulnerabil-
ity become the two major factors which exacerbate the
dispute. As a sea which holds a huge amount of
potential energy resources, it becomes potentially one
of the most protracted conflict zones in Asia Pacific,
where both regional and international players try to
assert their unequivocal primacy over the disputed
area. There are at least six countries with interests at
stake in the competing territorial and jurisdictional
claims of the South China Sea; China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
Among all claimants, China persistently displays the
most aggressive behaviour proven by the military
build-up and public statement by Chinese officials in
regard to their reluctance to engage with external
parties in the dispute such as the U.S. On the other
hand, the U.S. argued that they have underwritten
regional security for decades, patrolling Asia’s sea lanes
and preserving stability, therefore their presence in
playing a more contributing role in the region is
needed (Clinton, 2015). Notwithstanding the fact that
the U.S. has never been truly absent from Southeast
Asia, the ongoing commitment to its regional allies,
and overwhelming maritime military presence - the
perception that the U.S. role in regional affairs has
been declining since China’s has been ascending
cannot be easily dismissed (Anwar, 2013). I believe
that the risks of further alleviated tensions could
potentially increase. Therefore, unilateral action
similar to China’s in the Spratly Island would surely
bring more harm than good in the dispute settlement
effort.
At the height of global power projections, the
Republic of Indonesia as one of ASEAN’s founding
fathers who has been actively promoting the principle
of non-alignment notably known as its “non-block”
approach in international affairs, has tried to become a
pioneer in mitigating the potential risks surrounding
the region such as initiating the discussions on the
formulation of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC)
whereby China is willing to join the conduct despite
its current assertiveness. However, as a sovereign state,
Indonesia must also have its national interests at stake,
despite its commitment to contribute to peace and
security formation in both regional and international
affairs. Natuna Island claimed by China, is in fact part
of Indonesian territory. As of July 2015, the Indone-
sian Navy has agreed to build their military bases in
the forefront of Natuna Island. In October 2014,
Indonesia’s newly elected President Joko Widodo
announced a new top priority in terms of foreign
policy concern, emphasizing the importance of mari-
time vision through the officially announced vision of
“Global Maritime Nexus” (GMN). Through this
vision, Indonesia is expected to play a more contribu-
tive role in the formation of regional security and
economic integration. Moreover, GMN also aims to
enhance more cooperation on the basis of regionalism,
in order to enhance mutual benefits for instance in
terms of international trade. It therefore remains a
dilemma as to how Indonesia might pursue national
interests while maintaining its neutral position as a
non-claimant state despite the interest at stake in one
of the resource-rich islands of the South China Sea
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called Natuna Island. However, Indonesia is intent on
relying on the status quo, where non claimant status is
becoming their foundation in dealing with the South
China Sea dispute.
A variety of factors, therefore, have contributed to
the subject matter and research question here; the
increasing level of China’s assertiveness in the disputed
area, the U.S. commitment to strengthening benign
intention with its partners in Southeast Asia, some of
them being claimant states, and Indonesia’s ambition
to establish maritime-based cooperation in order to
pursue their own benefits and further bolster an
integrated regional architecture in order to advance
politics, economic, as well as security interests for all.
Even though it is not a panacea, cooperation could be
used as a tool to refrain from the use of force in any
dispute settlement. States bound into such a coopera-
tive partnership form will be less likely to take an
assertive attitude towards their partners. If they do an
adversarial attitude, this would potentially bring about
a complex security dynamic that further threatens the
existing cooperation. Maritime vision invigorated by
Indonesia could potentially bring about a more
inclusive region, since cooperation based on shared
opportunities is promoted. Therefore, question to
explore would be:
To what extent does Indonesia through its maritime vision
maintain neutrality in the South China Sea dispute
while pursuing national interests at stake?
I will look at the extent to which Indonesia
through its maritime vision, could maintain neutrality
within the breadth of uncertain geopolitics in the Asia
Pacific, while at the same time pursuing its national
interests at stake in the South China Sea. The data
analysis will focus on the following details; first, it will
explain the global power projections in the South
China Sea which involve the U.S. and China. Second,
it will explain the significance of maritime vision
invigorated by Indonesia towards the maritime bound-
ary dispute in the South China Sea. My argument that
will be elaborated later makes three significant points.
First, Indonesia will strive to maintain good relations
with all claimant and non-claimant states involved in
the South China Sea dispute in order to pursue its
national interests at stake. Second, maritime vision
could become a lynchpin to enhance unity among
regional actors such as ASEAN members, in order to
enhance benefits to them. Third, this could further
reduce the height of the great power projection in the
South China Sea, due to an array of potential shared
opportunity through cooperation.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
SECURITY DILEMMA
Research and attempts pursued by both academi-
cians and think-tanks have been helpful in examining
states’ behaviour through the basis of security di-
lemma. Started from the basic assumption of world
politics according to neorealist which believed that an
anarchic international system is a source of conflict,
thus state faced a condition as they need to make sure
that they are safe from other state’s hostile intention.
In order to strive a security attainment from any
plausible attack, both groups and individuals living
such a constellation are therefore driven to acquire
more and more power in order to escape the impact
of the power of others (Herz, 1950). Therefore states
will focus on the quest for security in the midst of
anarchic systems. He further suggested that groups and
individuals living in such a constellation must be, and
usually are, concerned about their security from being
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by
other groups and individuals. Thus, maximizing efforts
to prepare for the worst circumstance led by insecurity
is rising as no state can be certain about their security
at stakes. I would argue that this action is justifiable as
long as it does not threat other neighbours. World
politics is an unpredictable constellation where friends
and adversaries may be twisted. It may render to the
power competition if it goes unmanaged. Power
competition is partly emerged because no state wants
to leave behind by others. Charles Glaser defined
security dilemma as ‘situation in which the military
forces required by a state to protect itself threaten the
forces other states need to protect themselves; in that
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situation states seeking security cannot avoid threaten-
ing each other’s military capability‘ (Glaser, 1992).
Security dilemma partly emerged as the situation by
which a state tries to increase its security decrease the
security of others. This is actually not a new phenom-
enon in world politics. Take a look on the example
when Germany started building a powerful navy before
World War I, Britain who at that time also needed a
large navy to maintain the shipping lanes open,
objected that this action could only be an offensive
weapon aimed at them (Jervis, 1978). It is somehow
important for states to be able to define other’s
actions as misperceiving of other’s ‘‘defensive‘‘ actions
could be regarded as ‘‘aggressive‘‘ as what happened
during Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union (Snyder, 1984).
Therefore, Jervis’ findings that an increase in one
state’s security decreases the security of others, notably
known as the central point of security dilemma (Jervis,
1978) might be taken into account in understanding
the basic idea of analyzing state behavior on security
matters. Nonetheless, I believe that one state’s security
increase is not only decreasing others’ security, but
also themselves in the first beginning. Once state ‘A’
increases their security preponderances by the means
to make them safe from other’s attack, it will trigger
other states, name it state ‘B’ to, therefore feel inse-
cure due to its vulnerability thereby implying them to
increase security as well. It will in return increase state
vulnerability and automatically decrease its security.
International system which consists of the states and
organization established imply to the existing anarchic
system, for it lacks an overarching supranational
government, but is not chaotic thereby system is
defined by its key actors, their interactions, hierarchies
of power, and influence among them (Clemens,
1998). As the consequence of an uncertain strategic
situation, security dilemma is formed as a type of
insecurity dynamic between states, thereby state’s
knowledge of the other state’s motives is important in
order to engage in the worst-case scenario planning
(Glaser, 1997).
Glaser further argued that every state facing security
dilemma is more likely trapped in these patterns: first,
cooperate with others by the consequence other may
take advantage of them but they may get benefit due
to the shared opportunities, or second, no coopera-
tion but maximizing own effort to pursuit their
interests by achieving more benefits but less secure as
suspicion about others’ intention will be more likely.
This is formed as the dilemma between costs of war
and gains from cooperation bid. According to
Deutsch cited in Jervis (1978), there are four elabora-
tions in analyzing security dilemma and its relations
with cooperation. First, statesmen understand that
entering war means being ready to set off a chain of
unpredictable and uncontrollable events; second,
domestic costs of wars such as memories of disrup-
tions must be weighed since even the strong states can
be undermined by dissatisfaction with the way the war
is run and by necessary mobilization of people and
also ideas; third, turning to the advantages of coopera-
tion, for states with large and diverse economies the
gains from economic exchange are rarely if ever suffi-
cient to prevent war. And fourth, the gains from
cooperation can be increased, not only if each side gets
more of the traditional values such as wealth but also
other’s well-being positively. However, through
discussions, meetings, and formal arrangements of
cooperation, the high probability of conflict might be
reduced gradually as trust deficit declines respectively.
The South China Sea has witnessed a great power
competition due to security dilemma faced by interna-
tional actors surrounding. The United States and
China as region’s two big actors are seemingly willing
to assert their influence in the regions given abundant
national interests that they hold. The U.S. deep
engagement in the region is seen by China as threat to
their interests in the region. China is reluctant to
maintain the status quo in where the U.S. has a huge
portion in regional constellation by being a revisionist
instead. A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler defined
status quo states as those that have participated in
designing the ‘’rules of the game’’ and stand to benefit
from these rules, while ‘’challengers’’ or revisionist
states want a ‘’new place for themselves in interna-
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tional society’’ commensurate with their power
(Organski cited in Johnson, 2003). This pattern
emerges due to state’s security dilemma in which they
are perplexed in determining their positions in an
uncertain geopolitical situation.
As one of region’s rising powers, Indonesia is
willing to maintain the stability of peace and security
without disrupting the existing order. Within the
region, the dynamic of political and economic changes
at least present three main challenges namely; first,
challenge is concerned with domestic political and
economic in member states of regional organization
such as Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN); second, challenge is to balance the depth of
regional economic cooperation with similar coopera-
tion in political-security areas, and third challenge is to
strengthen the resolve and capacity to address non-
traditional security issues that have become more
salient within the region (Sukma, 2010). On the other
hand, Indonesia also has interests at stake in the
region given the salient rejections towards the ‘’nine-
dash line’’ published by China. Not intended to
change the status quo, Indonesia prefers to behave
benignly by offering the maritime-based cooperation in
Global Maritime Nexus so that all actors in the region
may possess an equal sharing of opportunities over the
disputed area. Nonetheless, according to Mak (2010)
in Asia Pacific’s maritime realm, there are three
principal interests group; the first are the established
maritime nations, the great users of ocean who see
freedom of navigation throughout the world as
essential for their well-being such as the United States,
Japan, and Singapore. Second, they are maritime
nations such as China, India, and South Korea; and
third the coastal states comprising Malaysia, Indone-
sia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Each of
them has different view in dealing with maritime
security while most of the reasons are for the sake of
national interests at stake.
SEA POWER
Geoffrey Till coined an idea that sea power holds
four historic attributes intimately connected with each
other, and each also exhibits the same cooperative and
conflictual tendencies characteristics of international
relations as illustrated in the figure below (Till, 2004).
Figure 1. The Four Historic Attributes of Sea (Till,
2004)
Given the fact that sea possesses a huge amount of
resources providing high road to prosperity, the need
of making the most of it also increases. In order to get
the enormous profits, it is important to make sure
that a highly developed technology for transportation
is applied. Furthermore, making sure its safety from
such threats is another crucial point which needs that
sort of sharing information with other actors playing
within. However, dominion is seemingly inevitable
since actors hold maritime strategies as Till further
argued include assuring sea control, projecting power
ashore in peace and war, attacking and defending
trade, directly and indirectly, and maintaining good
order at sea. Finally, naval roles will depend on the
scale of either maritime cooperation or conflict and
competition which potentially arise.
There have been numerous scholars coined the
linkage between geographic and politics of the nation.
Sir Halford John Mackinder who believed that world
history was full of stories about conflict between land
and sea powers highlighted that:
‘‘New Europes were created in the vacant lands discovered
in the midst of the waters, and what Britain and
Scandinavia were to Europe in the earlier time, that have
America and Australia, and in some measure even Trans-
Saharan Africa, now become to Euro-Asia.‘‘ (Mackinder,
1904).
Furthermore, the analysis on the importance of sea
power was gauged by Alfred Thayer Mahan, a United
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States admiral and geostrategic expert who perceived
sea as a ‘great highway‘ or ‘wide common‘ which
provides nations having access to it with a means of
transport easier and cheaper than any which exists
across land (Mahan cited in Bull, 1980). Military
power through naval roles at sea is therefore seen as
one of the fundamental elements in better supporting
states’ surveillance to safeguard national interests. He
further argued that the way to achieve this goal was
through the maintenance of great navy and superior
fleet of capital ships able to crush the adversary.
However, that sort of traditional sea power idea seems
quite unattainable since nations are no longer in a
Cold War period. There are now places for them to
achieve goals or national interests such as bilateral
cooperation, multilateral or regional discussion, and
the United Nations legally established as the organiza-
tion to safeguard peace and security in the world. If
some states behave aggressively by stressing on great
navy establishment, there will be many critiques from
its neighbours based on universal international law
where states should act accordingly. For all that, as the
world rapidly changes, sea is no longer seen as the
arena for military exercise but as an area full of strate-
gic opportunities for every international actor. Coop-
eration is thus expected to halt any possibility of
growing competition. Yet, it is important to note that
states who agree upon such cooperation should also
make a clearly legal limitation on territorial border in
where they are entitled to benefit from.
The South China Sea as a semi-enclosed sea hold-
ing huge amount of resources becomes a flashpoint for
any states that have interests at stake. This area offers
other potential in regard to the attribute of sea such as
transportation, information, and also dominion
which might occur due to great power projections.
However, in the long run, the full development of
regional economic ties will depend on the evolution
of the political relationship among the major Asian
powers thereby if these relationships turn sour and
suspicious, the movement toward wider and deeper
economic integration will falter and could collapse
(Friedberg, 1994). Dispute over borders and resources
in the South China Sea remain the major chronicles
for the steps toward a mutually integrated cooperation
in the region. Evolving position of claimants exacer-
bate the dispute as each claimant rests on their own
perspective on claiming the disputed zone. Some
states seem to align into the U.S. while some others
maintain a delicate pattern of partnership with China
thereby Southeast Asia is more likely to be divided in
regard to this dispute. Nonetheless, by having an
agreed consensus on the basis or maritime cooperation
as proposed by Indonesia through Global Maritime
Nexus (GMN), the level of security dilemma is ex-
pected to decline since the states will therefore have a
chance to benefit from the existing transportation and
information opportunities through a formal forum
thereby dominion may also be reduced.
Therefore, drawing upon the relationship between
security dilemma and sea power, Indonesia’s maritime
vision will explore the roles which they play in pursu-
ing national interests and maintaining neutrality in the
South China Sea dispute. The notion of security
dilemma has been useful in explaining Indonesia’s
awareness towards security and economic interests at
stake amidst uncertainty in international affairs
structured of overlapping interests between global
power notably known as the U.S. and China. Security
dilemma defines Indonesia’s anxiousness to concern
on their security from being dominated or annihilated
by other states. Thus, it is formulated into Indonesia’s
focus on sea power as seen as in the newly established
maritime vision, to offer a potential solution for peace
in the South China Sea through cooperation which
would take place in regional level. In Indonesia itself,
maritime vision through GMN is seen as the new
approach for international affairs despite its status as
an archipelagic state. Literature about GMN is cur-
rently limited since this policy has just been imple-
mented with an official blueprint which remains in
progress. However, Indonesia’s maritime vision will
mostly aim at achieving economic benefit and political
influence through which Indonesia could play a more
significant and contributive role in shaping regional
order. This will be applied through an analysis on
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different levels; maintaining neutrality which will
therefore carry consequences to promote peace among
the global power projections and pursuing national
interests which requires strategic attempts. Finally,
minimizing conflict and increasing the potential
opportunities through regional based cooperations
would be the prominent goals to achieve on this basis.
Figure 2. Map of disputed area in the
South China Sea
Source:http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650122-disputed-sea-growing-security-
nightmareand-increasingly-ecological-one-sea-
troubles?zid=306&ah=1b164dbd43b0cb27ba0d4c3b12a5e227
GLOBAL POWER PROJECTIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The current disorder springs not from the well-
known issues of naval rivalry and military balance on
the sea during World War, but from a revolution in
the rules and norms by which states regulate their
activity on the global commons of the oceans (Buzan,
1980). The Asia Pacific as one of the areas where
states’ interests overlap has huge potential of both
opportunities and conflicts more specifically in the
South China Sea where the contested primacy of
major powers is contested. The notion of the U.S.
Rebalance to Asia vis-à-vis China Peaceful Rise, which
has been predominantly marked by mistrust, often
leads states to face a security dilemma. It is therefore
reflected in the defence strategy in order to ensure
countries’ interests from being threatened by others.
The picture above depicts the disputed area, which
has increased states’ security levels in the region. If the
parties involved keep asserting their power leverage,
through for instance China and its reclamation at
Paracel Islands, I would predict the conceivable
predicament surrounding the South China Seas could
conceivably grow worse in the next couple of years.
Despite the existing legal basis concerning the codifica-
tion of the law of the sea in UNCLOS (United
Nations on the Law of the Sea), the two regional
powers; the United States and China, are seemingly
‘muscle-flexing’ by escalating assertiveness in territorial
claims of the South China Sea. Buzan (1980) further
argued that the growing turbulence of disagreement in
the sea was due to these two factors; first, a dramatic
rise in the realisable economic value of the oceans; and
second, the rapid spread of sovereign states to cover
virtually all the land areas of the planet triggered by
the need of the ever-increasing population seeking high
standards of living.
US REBALANCE TO ASIA
One of the most illuminating statements delivered
by US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on his remarks
on the next phase of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia
Pacific was:
‘’Asia Pacific is the defining region for our nation’s future
given a few data points: half of humanity will live there
by 2050, even sooner by 2030 more than half of the
global middle class and its accompanying consumption will
come from there, and it is already home to some of the
world’s largest militaries and defense spending.’’ (Defense
U. D., Secretary of Defense Speech, 2015).
After the U.S. war in Middle East, they are now
thinking of focusing on their pivot point in Asia since
it is considered as one of the key drivers of global
politics. U.S. argued that they have underwritten
regional security for decades patrolling Asia’s sea lanes
and preserving stability (Clinton, 2011). However,
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China’s rise has led the U.S. to think about the
strategic implication which implies the increase of
military presence of the U.S. has in the region. This
condition of a security dilemma which occurs due to
an uncertainty in international relations has worried
the U.S. so that expanding military presence is critical
to secure their interests at stake in the region. The
U.S. engagement in the region is seen in their involve-
ment in the establishment of the APEC Leaders’
Meeting and other forms of cooperation such as
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three,
and East Asia Summit. This form of cooperation
could be interpreted as insecurity dynamic reflection
in U.S.’ strategy by knowing other state’s motives
better so that they could engage in the worst-case
scenario planning due to the rise of China. U.S. also
needs to ensure their energy security as Kent Calder,
an American scholar has argued that the ’’radical
energy vulnerability’’ of key states in the region and
the rise of China as both ’’an emerging superpower
and an emerging competitor...for potentially tight
regional energy supplies’’ compounds the potential for
energy to become a “catalyst for regional conflict”
(Calder cited in Stares, 2000). Therefore suggests the
idea proposed by Till (2004) that the first part of
historical attribute of the sea, how resources drive
states to either engage in any sort of maritime coopera-
tion or conflict and competition. The U.S. somehow
plays a seemingly more balanced action by establishing
cooperation despite the fact that this condition might
trigger competition in the region due to the unbalance
economic power between U.S. and other Asia Pacific
regions mostly developing states.
CHINA PEACEFUL RISE:
China, despite its status as one of the regions’
wealthiest countries still needs its dependence on
imported sources of energy. Since 1993 it has been a
net importer of oil and gas, while since 1996 it has
become a net importer of crude oil. The major Asia
Pacific sources were Indonesia (6.30 Mt) and Vietnam
(1.01 Mt) and import will likely continue to grow in
the future (Shixian, 2000). Table below illustrates the
energy net import projections of China:
This situation, in turn, will contribute to and
complicate the problem of the existing maritime
boundary dispute in the South China Sea, as China’s
heavy dependence on the energy imports from South-
east Asian countries is facing U.S. who also asserts
their rebalance in Asia, more specifically the impor-
tance of the future energy demands. It is worth noting
that what is unfolding in Asia is a race between the
accelerating dynamics of multipolarity, which could
increase the chances of conflict, and the growth of
mitigating factors which will improve potential
continuing peace on the region (Friedberg, 1993-
1994). The dynamic of security dilemma-driven action-
reaction is seen in the economic and military competi-
tion which both US and China assert. Given the high
tension of competition, both states need to make sure
that their policy and actions over the South China Sea
are in line with the principle of peace. Miscalculation
would lead to the risk of unintended escalation in the
future. Even though China keeps insisting that it will
never enter into harsh conflict when it comes to any
dispute, its behaviour through People Liberation
Army (PLA) modernisation and other assertive re-
Source: Author’s projection based on China’s statistical Yearbook2010 (Shixian, 2000)
NOTE: Coal net import is minus; it refers to net export
E: Estimate; bm3: billion cubic meters, Mtce: million tons of coal equivalent; Mt: million tons.
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sponses in the South China Sea showed that they
hold a huge amount of interests at stake there. Fu
Ying, a spokeswoman for the National People’s
Congress on March 3, 2015 stated that:
‘’As a large country, China needs the military strength to
be able to protect its national security and people as our
history teaches us a lesson that when we lag behind, we
come under attack. We won’t forget that. Furthermore, we
need to continue modernising armed forces since there was
still a gap between us and other countries in terms of
military equipment’’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2015)
This strongly depicts a possibility of an arm races in
the region, which may involve China and U.S. as the
regions’ most powerful actors. In regard to the South
China dispute, China persistently displays an assertive
behaviour seen by the latest reclamation of the Spratly
Islands. This has raised U.S. concern by Republican
Senator John McCain and Democrat Jack Reed who
sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and
U.S. Defence Secretary Ash Carter stating that the
U.S. should build a strategy that includes measures to
’’slow down or stop China’s reclamation activities
there, by either releasing intelligence about this activity
more frequently or by stopping certain types of
security cooperation with China if necessary
(Brunnstrom, 2015). Indonesia, as one of the natural
leaders in the region, tries to respond the heightened
power competition between U.S. and China in these
particular situations by enunciating maritime coopera-
tion, which may lessen the possibility of great power
projections in the region as states are more likely to
cooperate instead of competing.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARITIME VISION
TOWARDS MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
In the post-Cold-War era, the South China Sea
could possibly become one of the most explosive
zones in the world with such complex overlapping
sovereignty claims. There are four contested areas in
the South China Sea, notably known as the Paracels
claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Spratly
Islands claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei; the Scarborough
Shoal claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines;
and the Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank claimed
by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Given the highly escalated claims among states which
could lead to dangerous competition, it is critical to
seek a peaceful approach to dispute settlement. As
explained previously, both China and the U.S. have
interests at stakes in the South China Sea which
consequently lead them to assert more power and
influence in the region. Indonesia sees itself as a non-
claimant states despite the fact that one part of
China’s claim in its ‘nine dashed line’ overlaps with
Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in Natuna Island.
However, Indonesia prefers to promote a confidence-
building measure as emphasized by Professor Hasjim
Djalal, an expert of international law of the sea who is
also a former Indonesian diplomat, by strengthening
the importance of undertaking cooperation for
emphasizing mutual benefits in areas where conflicting
territorial claim exists, including exchanges of informa-
tion and joint developments (Djalal, 2013).
With regard to the dispute, China has made series
of compliments sent by the Permanent Mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations with
reference to the Republic of Philippines Note Verbale
no. 000228 on Spratly Island (in Tagalog: Kalayaan)
which confirmed that:
‘’The so-called Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) claimed by
the Republic of Philippines is in fact part of China’s
Nansha Island …. Since 1970s, the Republic of Philip-
pines started to invade and occupy some islands and reefs
of China’s Nansha Islands and made relevant territorial
claims, to which China objects strongly. The Republic of
Philippines’ occupation of some islands and reefs of
China’s Nansha Islands as well as other related acts
constitutes infringement upon China’s territorial sover-
eignty’’ (DOALOS, 2009).
At the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in July
